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of rights-the outlines of which I shall discuss in a moment.
This Article is a contribution to that project. Its benefits are at
least these: it makes a modest advance in understanding the problems involved in the justification of rights; it provides a clarification
(if not resolution) of the debate over whether rights are claims or
entitlements; and it yields some decisive results on the question of
who (or what) can in principle have a right. This is enough to justify
the tedium of a piece of distinction-making.
I.

RIGHTS PER SE

I begin with a preliminary characterization of the root idea of a
right-a caricature, really-designed simply to elicit the elements
necessary for a general analysis of rights. 6
Suppose a right is characterized as follows:
To say that A has a (legal or moral) right against B is to say
that A has a (legal or moral) claim on an act or forbearance
from B-meaning that, should B fail to so act or to so forbear,
it would be (legally or morally) justifiable for A to use coercion
to extract either the act or forbearance from B, or compensation in lieu of it.
This characterization suggests all the elements necessary for an
analysis of the concept of a right as that concept is currently used.
Specifically, it suggests that a complete account of a particular right
(for example, a right to life) involves:
1) The specification of the right holder(s}-that is, what persons, beings, or things have the "claim."
2) The specification of the right regarder(s}-that is, what
"other(s)"-if any-the right holder has a claim against. (Some
reflection on the sorts of rights people are said to have indicates that
it is not always clear that th~ existence of right-regarders is being
asserted. Think of the putative right to health care.)
3) The specification of the act(s} or forbearance(s}-that is, the
thing(s) the right regarder(s) must do, or must refrain from doing;
what they may do, or may not do; or in the case of "regarderless"
rights, the benefits to which the right-holders have a "claim."
4) The definition of the nature of the rights-relationship-that
is, the sort of claim the holder has on the regarder; or the sort of
• In this section I review briefly, and with some modifications, the analysis presented in
my PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS ch. 2 (1977).

()
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claim the holder has on some benefit.
5) The definition of the conditions under which the right may
be said to have been violated-that is, the circumstances-if
any-which constitute a right regarder's culpable "failure" to act or
forbear as required. (The "violation" of a right must be distinguished from mere delay in doing what is required, and from nonculpable failure to do it.)
6) The definition of the conditions under which a violation of the
right (though culpable) is nonetheless excusable.
7) The specification of remedies for both excused and unexcused
violations of the right.
8) The specification of coercive measures for extracting the
remedies.
9) The specification of the agent(s) who may extract the
remedies.
10) The justification of the right defined by (1)-(9) above-that
is, the assembly of reasons which warrant the conclusion that the
right holder(s) do in fact have such a (legal or moral) claim.
A moment's thought about these elements reveals the inadequacies of the preliminary characterization of the root idea of a right.
We cannot say as it does-at least not without begging some important questions-that all rights are claims against others; or that
"compensation" is to be understood in its ordinary sense (perhaps
in some cases a mere apology will suffice); or that "coercion" is to
be given a literal meaning (perhaps sometimes a verbal demand is
as far as one may properly go); or that the right holder is the one
who may apply the coercion (perhaps only a law enforcement officer
may do so). Rights can evidently take a wide variety of forms-from
those vague entitlements that apparently point the finger at no one
in particular (because no one in particular can be said to be a rightregarder with respect to the holder), to the full dress legal rights
whose violation calls down the power of the state.
Further, reflection on these ten elements shows how misleading
it may be to speak of even a full dress legal right as involving a claim
on an act or forbearance from another. Hohfeld's analysis of the
sorts of rights-relationships recognized in law is instructive here. 7
One may have rights in the strict sense, he said (claim rights, as I
refer to them), which entail the existence of correlative duties in
others. But one may also have privileges (liberty rights) which sim7

W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919).
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ply correlate with the qbsence of claim rights in others. And one may
have powers (such as the right to make a will) which correlate with
liabilities in others, or immunities (such as the right to remain
silent) which correlate with disabilities in others. Each of these
relationships is commonly referred to as a right, but it disguises a
good deal to characterize all of them as "claims against someone for
an act or forbearance."
In short, the ten elements 'mentioned above provide a convenient
device for understanding the complexity of the concept of a right.
The failure to understand this complexity-or perhaps, just the
failure to understand it systematically-causes at least some of the
confusion in the theory of rights.
II.

GENERAL THEORY OF RIGHTS

Just as I assume that the definition of a particular right (such as
a right to life) requires the filling in of all ten elements mentioned
above, so too I assume that a general theory of rights requires a
general account of how each of the ten elements can in principle be
filled in for specific sorts of rights. That is, it requires an account of
who (or what) can in principle be a right-holder, or a right-regarder;
it requires an account of the general nature of the rights-relationship
that can obtain between holders and regarders; and so forth.
Hohfeld, as I mentioned above, has given an admirable (if somewhat incomplete) account of the general nature of rightsrelationships. That is one part of a general theory of rights. What I
shall do here is focus on another element necessary for a general
theory: element (10) in the list-the nature of justification. Specifically, I will explore a trichotomy in the way rights are justified (or,
as I shall sometimes say, in the way they are "established"). This
trichotomy is independent of the "substance" of a justificatory
strategy-that is, it is independent of whether one is attempting a
utilitarian, contractarian, or some other justification. It is a simple
distinction, but one which goes a long way toward clearing away
confusion in the theory of rights.
The trichotomy to which I refer is (oversimply) this: (1) Some
rights are held only derivatively, by way of the existence of duties
(or other Hohfeldian rights-correlatives) in others. (2) Other rights
originate, so to speak, in the right holders-and entail duties, or norights, or liabilities, or disabilities, in others. (3) Still other rights
arise simultaneously, as it were, with their correlatives-as when
rights and duties are created together by the making of a contract.
I propose to call the first sort of rights derivative rights; the second
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sort original rights; and the third sort concurrent rights. (It should
be noted that the temporal language here is only a metaphor for
matters of logical priority. It is not meant to be taken literally-that
is, to refer to matters of temporal priority-or to suggest causal
relationships.) First, then, derivative rights.

III.

DERIVATIVE RIGHTS

Some arguments for the existence of a right proceed by first establishing the existence of a right-correlative of some sort. For example,
one may first establish that B has a duty to A. It then (apparently)
follows that A, as the beneficiary of that duty, must "have" something-in fact, must have a claim right, if "right" is understood as
the Hohfeldian correlative of "duty." Arguments for the existence
of such rights do not depend (in principle) on whether the rightholders have conscious interests, or are able to "make" claims on
others, or are able to make agreements with others. The arguments
depend only on whether a duty toward that (putative) right-holder
exists. Such rights are derivative-established entirely by derivation from the (logically) prior existence of duties in others. There are
analogous arguments which proceed from the prior establishment of
no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities.
In principle, derivative rights can be either natural or conventional, depending on whether they come from natural or conventional rights-correlatives. I shall focus here on rights that are derivable from duties. The arguments can easily be modified, however, to
deal with the rights derived from no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities.

A.

The Nature and Scope of Derivative Rights

Derivative rights clearly are entitlements. That is, we would
clearly be willing to use that word to describe any such right: a duty
toward A entitles A to certain acts or forbearances from B; a noright with respect to A entitles A to act in certain ways regardless
of B's wishes; a liability with respect to A entitles A to alter B's
rights, duties, liabilities or disabilities; and a disability with respect
to A entitles A to freedom from a liability.
It is difficult to construe derivative rights as claims (of any familiar sort) that are distinct' from entitlements. Anyone who has a right
may claim acts or forbearances from others, of course. Or such
claims may be made on behalf of the right holder. It is clear, however, that the right exists whether the claim is made or not. So the
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sense in which derivative rights are claims seems equivalent to the
sense in which they are entitlements: namely, in the case of claim
rights, their requirement of an act or forbearance from someone (or
compensation in lieu of it); in the case of liberty rights, their denial
of a contravening claim in others; and so on.
Derivative rights may be held by anyone, or anything, to whom
duties (or no-rights, liabilities, or disabilities) are born. The question is whether there are conceptual limits to that sort of relationship, or whether derivative rights may in principle be held by any
object-for example, by rocks, trees, animals, human fetuses, and
the permanently comatose.
1. Duties toward and duties concerning. -One step commonly
taken toward an answer to that question is to point out that one may
have duties concerning something or someone without actually having duties toward that thing or person. s For example, my duty to
help Jones may actually be a duty to Jones' friend rather than
Jones. (Consider: "Mr. Jones, because lowe your friend a favor and
because she wants me to do this, I feel duty bound to do it-even
though I think you're worthless and I certainly don't owe you anything.) This is a duty concerning Jones, but (apparently) not a duty
to Jones. We would not want to say, in such a case, that Jones had
a right against me at all. It is Jones' friend whe has the right-a
right that I help Jones.
So to be able to say who (or what) has a derivative right in a given
case, we need to be able to say "to" whom-as opposed to
"concerning" whom-the duty (or other rights-correlative) is born.
Offhand, I see no way of doing this at the level of formal analysis.
One cannot simply say that the duty is "to" the person whose interests it satisfies, or who is an essential (as opposed to accidental)
beneficiary of the duty. These descriptions fit both Jones and his
friend. I suspect that in each case the question will have to be
settled by an analysis of the substance of the considerations that
justify the duty. (For example, in this case, the duty is defined by
a relationship between Jones' friend and me, not between Jones and
me.)
How to handle particular cases, however, is not the problem here.
What is needed is some guidance on the question of the range of
potential right-holders. And the distinction between duties "to" and
• See the discussion in Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 180 (1955);
and Lyons, supra note 2.

o

1979]

THREE TYPES OF RIGHTS

1203

duties "concerning" may yet be of help.
Surely we can say, can we not, that anyone or anything that could
benefit from another's performance of duty could be someone (or
something) "to" whom the duty is born? That is, surely the capacity
to be a "beneficiary" is sufficient to guarantee one the status of a
potential holder of derivative rights. It may not be a necessary condition; that is, there may be other ways to become a potential right
holder. And it is certainly not sufficient to establish that one is a
right holder. If one could benefit, however, surely it is logically
possible that one could be a derivative right holder. (The only evidence one can give for this assertion is, of course, the absence upon
semantic analysis of a contradiction between the two propositions:
(1) A could conceivably benefit from the performance of a duty; and
(2) the duty could (considering only (1) above) conceivably be "to"
A. I take it that there is no contradiction between the two.)
2. Possible beneficiaries of duties. -As it turns out, this is
enough to guarantee the status of potential (derivative) right
holder to virtually everything. Certainly it is true that any animate
being-whether purposive or not, whether it has conscious interests
or not, whether it is sentient or not-could be benefitted by the
performance of a duty. The case is not so clear for inanimate objects,
but it leans in that same direction. The chain of argument which
establishes this proposition runs as follows:
1) People can be benefitted (or harmed) without being aware of
it at the time-or indeed without ever being aware of it-in the
sense that their interests can be advanced or compromised without
their knowing it .
. 2) This is so (at least in part) because people may not actually
be aware of their "true" interests-e.g., those things they would
want for themselves if they were perfectly rational and all-knowing;
or those things they would want if they were not self-deceiving; or
those things they would want if they were more reflective or introspective.
3) If awareness of an interest is not a necessary condition for
having an interest, then the notion of having an interest must be
connected to an "objective" as well as a "subjective" notion of
people's welfare. That is, we must be able to make sense of the
notion of an event being "in" a person's interest ("for" his or her
welfare) without essential reference to whether or not that person
actually does or ever could be aware of that interest.
4) Such an "objective" notion of an individual's wel-
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fare-understood perhaps in terms of what the individual would
want if he or she were aware of the relevant facts-must then be
based on the observer's appreciation of what the individual would
want under those counterfactual conditions.
5) It is from such an "objective" stance that we can say, as
observers, that subjects are harmed or benefitted even if they are
not subjectively aware of it.
6) Now: if this is true for humans-that is, if it makes sense to
say that they can be benefitted or harmed whenever it is the case
that, had they been aware of all the facts, and had they been reflective and rational, they would have wanted (or not wanted) the
event-then the same must be true of any living being. Trees can
be benefitted or harmed in the same way. We have an objective, or
observer's, notion of their welfare-their "interests"-which is not
dependent on the presence or absence of a subjective awareness of
those interests by the trees themselves. We say-no more metaphorically for the tree than for the adult human being-that it can be
harmed, helped, injured, damaged, destroyed, or restored to health.
In neither case are we making necessary reference to consciousness,
purposiveness, sentience, or subjective awareness of any kind. The
language of interests may be metaphorical here-both in the case
of a person's "true" interests and in the case of a tree's interests-but the language of benefit and harm is not. The language of
benefit and harm is what is relevant to the question of who can be
a beneficiary of a duty. 9
7) Thus, any entity for which one can construct such an objective notion of welfare can be the beneficiary of a duty-and hence
the holder of a derivative right.
8) I take it that this is decisive in the case of all animate
beings-that is, that the construction of an objective notion of their
welfare is possible. Thus, human fetuses, neonates, the catastrophically retarded, and the permanently comatose can all in principle
be benefitted or harmed and can therefore hold derivative rights. A
similar conclusion is true for trees, fish, sponges, carrots, and other
animate beings.
9) What I take to be decisive in the case of animate beings I take
to be at least suggestive in the case of inanimate entities. Interference with their equilibrium mechanisms looks very much like interference with the growth of a plant, or with the homeostatic mecha• My colleague, H. Lamar Crosby, Jr., has explored a similar notion in Reflections on the
Scope of Justice (in typescript).
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nisms of an animal. Bizarre as it sounds, if an objective notion of
welfare-constructed by counterfactual speculation-is possible for
humans and other living beings, why not for inanimate objects as
well? My hesitancy here is due more to the novelty of the proposition than to any argument I can find against it.
In general, then, the conclusion is that the class of potential derivative right-holders includes animals, fetuses, trees, the comatose,
and probably even inanimate objects. This is not to say, of course,
that each of these objects can hold any sort of derivative right. Some
rights-relationships (such as powers, or liberties to act) require in
principle a potentially "active" right holder-that is, one who can
exercise a power or a liberty. It makes no sense to speak of the right
of an inert gas to make a will. The situation is the same for some
claim rights and immunities; they too may require a potentially
active right-holder. (Think of the immunity right to remain silent;
or the claim right to an education.) But claim rights and immunity
rights can be purely passive relationships on the part of the right
holders. (Think of the claim right to freedom from deliberate interference with one's welfare.) This is what makes the class of potential
derivative right-holders so large.
B. Justifying Duties
Whether there are in fact any duties to inanimate objects (or
vegetables, and rudimentary forms of animal life, for that matter)
has of course not been settled here. From the fact that these things
are potential right-holders, it does not follow that any of them are
right-holders. It only follows that we cannot rule out, on purely
formal grounds, all derivative rights that might be claimed for
them.
I noted earlier, however, that derivative rights could in principle
be either natural or conventional, depending upon whether the correlatives from which they were derived were natural or conventional. I now make a few remarks on this distinction, because it has
some bearing on the next sort of right to be considered: original
rights.
1. Natural duties.-The crux ofthe distinction between natural
and conventional duties (or rights) is clearly in the sort of considerations that justify them or "establish their existence." That is, I
know of no reason in principle why natural duties should have either
a special content (e.g., concerning the minimum conditions necessary for survival) or a special form (e.g., applicability to all). Rather,
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it is apparent that what is fundamental to the distinction is the
thought that some duties (the natural ones) might "exist" independently of anyone's knowledge of them, or assent to them. It would
thus make sense to speak of "discovering" such duties as opposed
to creating them. We create duties by convention; we justify
them-establish their existence-by appeal to convention. We discover, or "find," natural duties; we justify them-establish their
existence-by appeal to something other than convention.
What is that "something other"? The answer is in large measure
determined by the initial characterization of the distinction between the' natural and the conventional. For present purposes, I
shall regard as "natural" any duty that can be justified without
reference to an agreement or aim to create that particular duty.
(This may be a more expansive definition than some would favor,
but I think it is a harmless expansion.)
Such natural duties (i.e., justifications for duties) are of at least
three sorts. First, a duty is a natural one if its existence is entailed
by the existence of duties per se. For example:
1) If there are some duties whose existence cannot be disputed
(e.g., some conventional duties); and
2) If any such duties, regardless of their content, entail a further
duty X; then
3) That further duty X is a natural one. It is natural because it
is not itself the product of a specific convention aimed at creating
that particular duty, but rather the product of the form of all such
activity. The existence of such a duty is contingent on the existence
of convention, but it is not itself conventional. (H. L. A. Hart has
offered an analogous argument for the existence of a natural right
to liberty.)10
Second, the existence of a natural duty may be established by
reference to the conditions necessary for the realization of social or
individual goals. For example:
(1) If some goal Y is (morally) justifiable; and
(2) If the existence of a duty X is necessaryll for the realization
of the goal Y; and
Hart, supra note 8.
Similar, but weaker, arguments may be constructable from the premise that the imposition of a duty X is simply the best (most effective) means for realizing a justifiable goal, but
I shall avoid that complication here-and in the next argument below. I assume that if a duty
X is only one of several equally effective means, the argument as it stands would not go
through.
10

11
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(3) If there are no (sufficient) reasons for thinking that the
existence of the duty X is unjustifiable; then
(4) The existence of duty X is justifiable-in the sense that
there are good reasons for having it (its necessity for the realization of a morally justifiable goal), and no countervailing reasons for not having it.
A duty so established may plausibly be called a natural one because
it does not arise from an aim to create that particular duty, but
rather raises as a consequence of other activities and circumstances.
The existence of such duties is contingent on the existence of justifiable goals for whose realization they are necessary, and upon the
absence of countervailing reasons. The duties may thus range from
impermanence in the extreme to permanence, depending on the
universality and/or stability of the goals involved and other relevant
circumstances. For example, one supposes that survival goals
among normally formed human beings are relatively universal and
stable, and that any natural duties derived from such goals (such
as the prohibition of murder) would be likely to have similar characteristics. On the other hand, some of the "duties of friendship" may
be as fleeting as the whims of one's friends and/or one's freedom
from something better to do.
The third way in which a natural duty may be justified is by
reference to the requirements of justifiable social institutions.
Human parents, for example, may be said to have duties to their
children in part because the institution of the family requires them.
In general:
(1) If an institution is (morally) justifiable as it is defined; and,
(2) If-although its definition does not itself entail the existence of a duty X-that duty is necessary to the continued
viability of the institution; and
(3) If there are no (sufficient) reasons for thinking that the
existence of the duty X is unjustifiable; then
(4) The existence of duty X is justifiable in the sense that there
are good reasons for having it (its necessity for the viability of
a justifiable institution), and no countervailing reasons for not
having it.
A duty so established may also be called a natural one. It too does
not arise from an aim to create that particular duty. Its existence
may be contingent upon the existence of institutions established by
convention, but it is not itself a conventional duty.
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2. Conventional duties.-Given what has been said about natural duties, conventional ones may be defined as duties that are the
(justifiable) products of activities aimed specifically at creating
those duties.
Some conventional duties emerge gradually from customary behavior by the growth of a consensus that what is customary should
be obligatory. Others emerge from a consensus unrelated to existing
customs (for example, from a consensus generated by revolutionaries or reformers). Still others arise from regularized legislative or
contractual processes.
The justification of particular conventional duties may take
roughly the same form as that for natural duties:
(1) If the consensus exists (or if people have explicitly agreed)
that B has a duty X; and
(2) If there are no reasons sufficient for thinking that that duty
for B is unjustifiable; then
(3) That duty is justifiable in the sense that there is good reason for B's having it (people want B to have it), and no countervailing reasons for B's not having it.
Conventional duties include, but are not limited to, contractual
duties.
Similar arguments can be made for other Hohfeldian categories.
A no-right, or a liability, or a disability may in principle be regarded
as either natural or conventional, and if its existence is established
first, and used to argue for the existence of the corresponding liberty, power, or immunity, then one has an argument for a different
sort of (natural or conventional) derivative right.
IV.

ORIGINAL RIGHTS

I turn now to the second sort of right in the trichotomy-the rights
I have called original rights. The basic idea is simple: Many arguments about rights are not about derivative rights at all. That is,
they do not attempt to establish a duty or other correlative first and
then derive a right from ~t. Rather, they attempt to establish the
right-holder's claim or entitlement first, and then to derive the appropriate correlative from that.
The motive for finding such rights is not hard to see. There is,
after all, something unsatisfying about saying that a child's right to
life comes only from the prior existence of duties in others; that
there is nothing about a child which "reaches out," as it were, and
makes a claim on others-a claim which itself constitutes a right

1979]

THREE TYPES OF RIGHTS

1209

from which others' duties are then derived. If there are derivative
rights (e.g., rights entailed by duties), are there not also derivative
duties? Are there not duties whose existence is established by inference from the existence of rights?
The temptation to say "Of course" to such questions is strong.
The notion of a right that rests on-is established by reference
to-others' duties seems too weak to express the force of a person's
right to life, for example. Surely that right must originate somehow
"with" or "in" the person.
The difficulty of saying just how such an original right could be
established, however, is notorious. Some people hold that one must
find some "morally relevant characteristics" of the putative rightholder that yield the rigat. 12 If this is the strategy adopted it is clear
that one must find a characteristic that is not dependent upon a
right-making "bargain" between the parties. Original rights are not
contractual rights.

A.

Conventional Rights

Some original rights, however, may be conventional. That is, an
original right might emerge from a consensus in much the way a
conventional duty does. It might emerge from custom, as customary
behavior gradually achieves the status of an entitlement for which
there is no countervailing moral argument. It may emerge from a
consensus about entitlements provoked by reformers or revolutionaries. Or it may come through regularized legislative processes, including the legislative acts of judges and executives. (Again, as in
the case of customary behavior, such rights are only established
when there is no countervailing moral argument to be found.)
The difference, then, between a conventional derivative right' and
a conventional original right is the priority given to the justification
of the right rather than its correlative. Of course, this priority may
be purely "temporal" -in which case the warrant for saying that the
right is either derivative or original disappears. (The rights and
duties thus establishep are best thought of as concurrent ones,
which I discuss below.) The priority may, however, be logical as
well. That is, it may be that the concern to establish the right12 See Michael Tooley's discussion in Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 37
(1972), amended and expanded in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABORTION 52-84 (M. Cohen ed.
1974). See also Robert Nozick's remarks on the moral basis of rights in ANARCHY, STATE AND
UTOPIA 28-35 (1974), criticized by Samuel Scheffler in Natural Rights, Equality, and the
Minimal State, 6 CAN. J. OF PHIL. 59 (1976).
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admittedly many things which (given the proper setting) count as
exercising a power: for example, the explicit, conscious, overt claiming of a right; or expressions of a preference, It seems clear, however,
that, by definition, if an entity is incapable of purposive activity per
se, it could not exercise a power-right,
To the extent that claims of right (as original rights) rest upon
power-rights, then, they require that holders have the capacity for
purposive activity, Further, they require that some such activity,
which can reasonably be construed as the exercise of a power, be
performed by the right-holder. There is reason to think that many
animals or human infants can meet these conditions: They can in
principle have at least derivative powers, or even conventional, original ones; and they can do things which, were they done by humans
in the same context, would unquestionably count as the exercise of
a power. The question of whether animals or infants have natural,
original rights by way of claiming them is thus reduced to whether
they have the corresponding power-rights.

D. Status Rights
There is still something unsatisfying in this account. It is often
insisted that people's rights to life or liberty, for example, do not
depend on their exercise of any power, but come simply from their
status as human beings. (The same sort of insistence is then occasionally extended to other species.) This sort of right-a natural,
original, status right-is difficult to justify, however.
Consider: It is easy enough (in principle) to establish derivative
status rights, natural or conventional. All one has to do is establish
the relevant correlative duties-duties that yield rights to all members of that group. And it is easy enough to establish the relevant
correlative duties. It is also easy enough to establish original status
rights by appeal to convention: If we agree that humans have some
right simply by virtue of their status as humans, and there are good
reasons for so agreeing and no countervailing ones to be found, then
surely humans have that right.
What we are looking for here, however, is a status right that does
not derive from prior duties in others, and that does not depend on
convention. We have to find grounds for an argument of the form:
(1) There are good reasons for holding that all A's, simply by
virtue of their status as A's, have right R (from which the
rights-correlatives of others derive).

'\

o
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(2) The fact (if it is a fact) that people (no matter how many)
refuse to agree that A's have right R is irrelevant to whether or
not A's have that right.
(3) There are no countervailing reasons to (1).
(4) Therefore, A's have right R.

o

In outline, this is no less concrete than the accounts given above
for derivative rights and conventional, original ones. In those earlier
cases, however, it was easy to see that the set of rights so defined
was not in principle empty. One could imagine the sorts of considerations that would establish such rights.
In the case of the argument form just given, however, it is not easy
to see how premises (1) and (2) could be established. What sorts of
reasons could there be to support a natural, original, status right?
A common suggestion is to explore certain characteristics possessed
by "persons" (i.e., individuals who have a self-concept and are purposive) .13 I shall therefore focus on that suggestion, to illustrate the
justification of status rights.
1. Personal rights. -Self-consciousness-that is, being conscious of oneself as distinct from other things and other persons-necessarily involves a "sense" of physical and psychological
boundaries. If my body is distinguishable from its surroundings, it
necessarily has physical boundaries. To the extent I am conscious
of it as distinct, I am conscious of boundaries. Further, if my consciousness is normally inaccessible to others except by inference
from my behavior (verbal or otherwise), spatial (boundary) metaphors for this fact are appropriate. My consciousness of myself as
an entity necessarily· includes, then, consciousness of physical
boundaries and consciousness of the "separateness" of my consciousness itself. Further, persons invariably "manage" these
boundaries-by making a distinction between trespass and visit, as
it were, and acting accordingly.
Human persons are also purposive. They have projects that they
strive to achieve'-even if these projects are not fully self-conscious;
even if they are self-annihilating. And they resist interference with
these projects.
All the behavior just mentioned-the boundary-keeping, the resistance to interference with projects-can be part of the process of
claiming rights, of course. But it is their dispositional aspect-the
13 By far the most detailed and systematic attempt to work out such a position is Alan
Gewirth's. See his REASON AND MORALITY (1978) and his article included in this symposium.
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fact that human persons as we know them always stand ready to
make such demands-that seems to provide an opening for an argument for status rights. The argument proceeds as follows:
If boundary-keeping and resistance to interference are necessary
consequences of becoming a person (i. e., developing a self-concept
and becoming consciously purposive), and if such persons exist, and
if they want to continue to exist, it it reasonable to place the burden
of proof on anyone who proposes to trespass personal boundaries, or
interfere with a person's purposive behavior. If such trespassing or
interference cannot be justified, the way is open for a further argument to establish personal rights to liberty. That argument would
have to show that there are good reasons to recognize entitlements
in persons to freedom from trespass (of their personal boundaries)
and freedom from interference with their purposive conduct.14
Now the problem with concluding that status rights are original
rather than derivative (or concurrent) is just this: While it is true
that their justification begins with a reference to the characteristics
of the putative right-holder and then shifts the burden of proof to
others to show that they do not have the correlative duty (or noright, liability, or disability), the same logical form can be used to
justify duties first. In short, while the justification of such rights
depends on characteristics of the right-holder, there is apparently
no more reason to think that those characteristics lead (logically)
to original rights than to derivative ones. If this is so for personal
(status) rights, it would seem to hold for any attempt to argue for a
natural, original, status right.
I think this is wrong, for the following reasons. Arguments that
make primary reference to the putative duty-bearer's roles, interests, and goals (even though they also involve essential reference to
the right-holder's status, interests, or whatever), seem clearly directed-as a matter of logical form-to establishing the duty first.
It is not just a matter of indifference which one is established first,
for the whole point is to secure the ascription of a duty (or other
right-correlative) even if no particular right-holder can be identified
with certainty. Similarly in the case of original rights: the point of
those arguments is to justify the entitlement of the holder-whether
or not a particular class of right-regarders can be specified. Of
course it can be a matter of (logical) indifference as to which comes
14

I have argued for the soundness of the general form of such arguments in ON JUSTIFYING

MORAL JUDGMENTS

(1973).
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first (and in those cases, I would classify the rights as concurrent
ones, as I do below). But it need not be a matter of indifference.
This opens the door, in principle, for the justification of status
rights for virtually anything. Rights requiring the capacity for action
(e.g., powers or liberties) are of course restricted to entities with
those capacities. "Passive" rights (e.g., some sorts of claim rights
and immunities), however, are not so restricted.
E. Interests
A final word about interests is in order. Some have urged (either
implicitly or explicitly) that a being's capacity to have interests is
a necessary condition of its having rights. 15 For reasons which should
by now be clear, I think such an assertion is seriously misleading at
best.

V. CONCURRENT RIGHTS
I turn now to the final part of the trichotomy-concurrent rights.
The basic idea is simple enough: There "are times when it is odd to
think of either a right or its correlative as being antecedent to the
other-when it appears that A's rights and B's corresponding duties
(or other correlatives) arise concurrently. Example: Suppose a third
party drafts a document that, if accepted by A and B, would create
a right in A and a duty in B. The document is presented to A and
B and they say, simultaneously, "I accept." B now has a duty toward A, and A has a right against B. But the right is neither derived
from nor antecedent to the duty. It arises concurrently with the
duty.
The establishment of such rights can be achieved by a straightforward application of the justificatory strategies outlined in the
preceding pages. It seems clear that, in principle, there could be
both natural and conventional rights of this sort.
It is, however, sometimes difficult to resist the thought that all
rights are at bottom concurrent ones. If each right has a correlative-if, in fact, the existence of a right logically entails the existence of a correlative duty, or no-right, or liability, or disability-then it may appear that all rights and their correlatives are
concurrent ones. The only significant difference between concurrent
rights and derivative and original ones seems then to be one of
emphasis. Which element in the dyad is the focus of attention?
15

See text and references in Feinberg, supra note 3.
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Which element gets the initial justificatory argument (leaving the
other to be derived from it)? Couldn't the attention and justificatory
strategy always in principle be focused concurrently on both
elements?
To see that this is not so, consider: In the case of original rights,
the focus of attention (and the initial justificatory argument) are
necessarily on the right holder because the right holder's characteristics are primarily responsible for generating the right-relationship.
And in the standard offer and acceptance analysis of the making of
a contract, the right-relationship emerges in stages: A has the power
(right) to make an offer to B; A makes the offer, creating in B a
power to accept and thus create a contract. B's power to accept,
when exercised, creates the duties and rights mentioned in the contract. Here we may have all three sorts of rights: A's power-right to
make an offer to B may be an original one. A's exercise ofthe power
is what creates B's power (right) to accept. B's power-right is in that
sense derivative from A's power-right. And B's acceptance creates
concurrent rights and duties in A and B. The distinctions among the
three sorts of rights are thus more than merely rhetorical or heuristic.
Of course the distinctions can be merely incidental matters of
emphasis. In the case of conventional or natural rights where the
justificatory arguments rest as much on the character and status of
the duty-bearers as it does on the character and status of the right
holders (and vice-versa), the focus on one or the other may have
only a rhetorical or heuristic jus~ification. But that should not be
allowed to obscure the fact that there are cases in which the distinctions are formal rather than rhetorical.

VI. CONCLUSIONS
The point of this article has been to clear away some of the confusion about the concept of a right. No normative conclusions have
been established directly, but there are some logical consequences
of relevance to normative discussions.

A. Animals' Rights
For one thing it is clear that there is no formal obstacle to establishing a wide variety of rights for non-human animals. They can,
of course, in principle have (both natural and conventional) derivative rights. To the extent that an animal can have interests, or make
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claims, or has a self-concept and is purposive, (natural) original
rights are possible. In fact, the only serious formal limitation on the
whole class of those non-human animals now known to us is the
same as one of the limitations on human infants (and some incompetent adults): They cannot have those conventional rights in which
the right-holder must make an explicit agreement to accept a specified rights-relationship (e.g., an agreement to the terms of a contract). They cannot have such rights because they cannot make
such agreements.
There are, of course, severe formal limitations on the rights that
can be held as one goes down the evolutionary ladder. Dogs may be
able to make (some sorts of) claims. But can oysters? Chimpanzees
may be persons, but are bees? Regardless of the priority to be assigned to human rights, then, there are at least some rights that
normal adults of our species can hold which normal adults of other
species cannot hold. And at the lowest end of the scale, it is probably fair to say that the only rights those animals (like sponges or
clams) actually have are certain sorts of derivative rights.
"

Trees, Rocks and Fresh Water Streams
Non-animal elements of the environment probably can have some
sorts of derivative and concurrent rights, too. Thus, if there is a legal
question as to whether trees can be right-holders, and if derivative
rights are enough to give humans legal standing, then the burden
of proof is surely on anyone who wishes to deny that trees can have
standing. But again the range of types of rights available is severely
limited. I see no way that it could include natural, original rights,
for example.
B.

Zygotes, Embryos, Fetuses and Infants
The rights available in principle to human beings increase as
biological development proceeds. Zygotes do not make claims or
have a self-concept. (At least we have no reason to think so, and
many reasons to think not.) They can, however, have derivative or
concurrent rights of the same sorts available to trees and shellfish.
As development proceeds, the fetus appears to be able to make
some of the same sorts of responses which, if made by an adult
animal of another species, we would be tempted to call a claim.
Natural, original, claims to rights are thus not out of the question
at this stage and certainly they are available to the newborn. Personal rights must, of course, wait until later.
C.
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The Permanently Comatose

Whole brain death, as defined by the Harvard panel,16 entails the
loss of personal rights, as the term is used in this Article. It also
entails the loss of claim-making capacity and the capacity to make
agreements. Claims and agreements made prior to brain death,
however, may have yielded rights which remain in force. And the
comatose may have some sorts of derivative and concurrent rights
as well.
No doubt the point need not be belabored any longer. The differences between derivative, original, and concurrent rights are not
illusory. And the awareness of this trichotomy is a significant help
in clearing away some confusions both about the justification of
rights and the range of entities that can be right-holders.

I'

18 Report of the Harvard Medical School ad hoc Committee on the Definition of Brain
Death, reprinted in H. BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL 311-19 (1970).
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